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and a hunger strike, she was freed on bail in 
July 1995 after a second appeal in which she 
won the right to a retrial. New psychiatric evi-
dence was heard during the retrial which led 
the judge to rule that a “personality disorder” 
drove Sara to kill her violent, drunken hus-
band. Thus, while the appeal court judges had 
refused to accept Sara’s defence of provocation 
three years earlier, the retrial judge now ruled 
that ‘your responsibility for killing your hus-
band was diminished by your abnormality of 
mind’ (Guardian 31st May 1996; Independent 
5th May 1995). She was consequently freed in 
May 1996 after her murder charge was reduced 
to manslaughter (Independent 5th May, 29th 
May 1995; Guardian 31st May 1996).
Thornton’s case was one of a number of high-
profi le cases that emerged during the 1990s 
which highlighted not only the serious level 
of inconsistency in the sentencing between 
men and women who kill their partners1, but 
also the legal diffi culties involved in defending 
women who retaliate after having suffered a 
prolonged period of abuse and violence at the 
 1 Sara began her hunger strike after learning that two 
days after her appeal had failed, Joseph McGrail had 
received a two year suspended sentence after kicking 
his partner Marion Kennedy to death (Ballinger 2000: 
205; 333). 
Summary
This article makes a contribution to current debates 
about gender and punishment by providing an histo-
rical analysis of the judicial fate of female domestic 
abuse victims who eventually killed their male abusers 
 between 1900-1965 in England and Wales.
 Utilising case-studies of women who stood trial for 
the murder of their abusive partner during this period 
when murder was still punishable by hanging – I argue 
that what at fi rst glance appears to be a ‘lenient’ sen-
tence, in fact came at a heavy price for which all women 
ultimately paid and still pay. That is the maintenance 
of a gender order which denied women the status of 
full citizenship. ‘Lenient’ sentencing is shown to be 
based on stereotypical images of femininity and while 
it may have appeared to benefi t individual women it 
did nothing to improve the legal situation of battered 
women generally. These historical case-studies help wi-
den our understanding of current debates about gender 
and punishment by re-interpreting the women’s act of 
violence. The paper seeks to shift the focus away from 
provocation, diminished responsibility and irrationality 
to issues of rationality and agency – without losing 
sight of the specifi c circumstances in which the kil-
ling took place, and therefore without inviting harsher 
punishment.
Introduction
In February 1990 Sara Thornton was sentenced 
to life imprisonment after being found guilty 
of murdering her abusive husband. Following 
one failed appeal, a strong feminist campaign 
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hands of their partner.2 As such these cases 
came to exemplify the reinterpreting – if not 
silencing – of the battered woman’s own ex-
planation of her actions in the particular cir-
cumstances she found herself in. For example, 
Sara explained the context within which she 
stabbed her husband in the following terms: 
that she had endured many months of drink-
fuelled violence during which she had sought 
help from numerous agencies to no avail; that 
prior to his death, Malcolm had threatened to 
break the legs of Sara’s daughter Luise, and 
that she believed his threat was a real one and 
therefore had acted to protect her daughter as 
well as herself (Nagel 1993; Independent 5th 
May 1996; Guardian 15th May 1996). Told 
in its unmediated form during her fi rst trial it 
led to a murder conviction and a life-sentence. 
However, after being mediated by experts – in 
this case psychiatrists who claimed they had 
identifi ed a personality disorder which could 
be held partly responsible for Sara’s actions 
– a different outcome was produced – that of 
a manslaughter verdict and Sara’s immediate 
release. 
For feminist scholars the Sara Thornton case 
exemplifi es two key problems facing battered 
women in contemporary England and Wales 
when they attempt to explain the killing of their 
abuser from their experiential standpoint – the 
masculinist nature of law, and the way in which 
expert knowledge – engulfed in the power and 
prestige of scientifi c discourses – is called upon 
to invalidate, mediate and/or translate the de-
fendant’s ‘biographical claims and experien-
tial truth claims’ into a legal format stipulated 
by, and acceptable to law (Ballinger 2003: 
221). As Worrall has pointed out, ‘members 
of muted groups, if they wish to communicate, 
 2 See for example the cases of Emma Humphrys (Stanko 
& Scully 1996; Bindel and Wistrich 2003; Ballinger 
2000: 333-7)) and Kiranjit Ahluwalia (Ahluwalia and 
Gupta 1997; Ballinger 2000: 333-7). See also Edwards 
1996: 371-2.
must do so in terms of the dominant modes of 
expression’ (Worrall 1990: 11).
Utilising case-studies from the period 1900-
1965 I shall argue that these problems are not 
unique to modern trials, rather, battered women 
who eventually kill their abusers have a long 
history of offering rational and ‘reasonable’ 
explanations for the action they took, given the 
circumstances they found themselves in. I shall 
further argue that the criminal justice system 
has an equally long history of dismissing, in-
validating or re-interpreting such explanations, 
the purpose being to ‘render the women harm-
less’.3 That is, in replacing agentic explana-
tions with pathological excuses the women’s 
actions came to appear irrational – the product 
of a diseased mind – hence they could not be 
held fully responsible for their actions. I shall 
argue that this process takes place in order to 
neutralise the perceived threat battered women 
who kill their abusers present to the dominant 
discourses of heteropatriarchy. That is, they 
challenge its main institutions of the family 
and home as a loving place, instead expos-
ing them as sites of threats, fear and violence 
(Morrissey 2003: 67). This undermining and 
re-interpretation of the women’s own narra-
tives can therefore ultimately be understood 
as minimising the opportunity for the creation 
of an alternative truth about violence against 
women, whilst simultaneously playing a key 
role in supporting and reinforcing patriarchal 
relations by reducing the threat battered women 
pose to the gendered social order.
The purpose of this paper is therefore not to 
provide a detailed review of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various legal defences avail-
able to such women since this has been done 
 3 I have borrowed this phrase from Allen, H. (1987) 
‘Rendering Them Harmless’ in Carlen, P. and Wor-
rall, A. (1987) Gender, Crime and Justice OU Press 
pp.81-94.
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eloquently elsewhere (O’Donovan 1991; Chan 
2001; Morrissey 2003). Instead my aim is to 
provide insight into the relationship between 
law’s ability to defi ne the ‘dominant truth’ 
about battered women who kill and the ability 
of those women to challenge that truth with 
their alternative accounts of events, and how 
successful that challenge might be in having 
a wider impact upon the social order within 
which the interaction between law and gen-
der is conducted. More specifi cally, I wish to 
explore the extent to which it is ‘possible to 
apply feminist-inspired law reform to the bene-
fi t of women … given the deeply embedded 
masculinist attitudes’ within the judiciary (Fox 
1995: 180). As such the aim of the paper is 
to contribute to the feminist task of develop-
ing ‘discourses and practices which are not 
yet there’ (Cain 1993: 89) by unlocking and 
re-examining the biographical knowledge and 
experiences of women who resisted domestic 
violence by killing their abusers during the fi rst 
half of the 20th century.
The Phallocentric Nature of 
Law and Expert Knowledge
Smart has written that ‘both law and masculin-
ity are constituted in discourse and there are 
signifi cant overlaps in these.’ Consequently, 
‘law is not a free-fl oating entity, it is grounded 
in patriarchy, as well as in class and ethnic di-
visions’ (Smart 1989: 86; 88). As such, it has 
a vested interest in reproducing and perpetuat-
ing ‘the most secure foundations of patriarchal 
relations … the family and gender divisions’ 
(Smart 1995: 129). The term ‘phallocentric 
law’ is appropriate here because:
Phallocentrism attempts to give some insight 
into how patriarchy is part of women’s (as well 
as men’s) unconscious, rather than a superfi cial 
system imposed from outside and kept in place by 
social institutions, threats or force. It attempts to 
address the problem of the construction of gendered 
identities and subjectivities. Law must, therefore, 
be understood both to participate in the construc-
tion of meanings and subjectivities and to do so 
within the terms of a phallocentric culture (Smart 
1995: 78).
Similarly, Hudson has argued that the ‘bedrock 
concepts of law are constructed from a male 
view of the world … because the political-
legal-cultural structure of modern societies is 
based on masculine imaginary’:
That is to say, the cultural complex of which law is 
part is based on constructions of subjectivity based 
on masculine philosophies; it is based on mascu-
line desires, masculine imaginings, of the life they 
would lead, and masculine fears about the structures 
and other subjectivities that are likely to obstruct the 
fulfi lment of their desires and ambitions (Hudson 
1998: 34; original emphasis).
To this overlap between law and masculinity 
we can add another layer, that of expert know-
ledge – a second key problem facing battered 
women who have killed their abusers. Despite 
several recent high profi le cases of ‘expert’ 
evidence being discredited, it is nonetheless 
the case that such testimony is now virtu-
ally institutionalised within the courtroom, 
particularly in trials involving serious crimes 
such as murder.4 Whether heard on behalf of 
the prosecution or the defence, expert evi-
dence ‘lends medical and professional cred-
ibility’ to the pathologising of battered women 
who retaliate, and by defi nition, therefore also 
minimises their agency (Worrall 2002: 57). 
 4 A recent example of the discrediting of an ‘expert’ 
is that of Sir Roy Meadows whose evidence played a 
crucial role in securing murder convictions for Sally 
Clark and Angela Cannings whose convictions were 
subsequently found to be unsafe as a result of Sir Roy’s 
testimony. At least another 28 cases in which he gave 
evidence are currently undergoing review and may well 
result in further murder convictions being quashed (In-
dependent 22nd December 2004). See also Guardian 
4th February; 6th April; 21st September; 30th Novmber 
2004; 11th January 2005; Observer 12th December 
2004.
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As such, expert knowledge can also be seen 
to play a key role in securing the ongoing 
reproduction and perpetuation of patriarchal 
relations. This symbiotic relationship between 
law and expert knowledge works extremely 
well, because we know from numerous femi-
nist critiques that science – from which expert 
knowledge is forged – is also masculinist in 
nature, built on the key Enlightenment princi-
ples of reason, rationality and objectivity, the 
same prin ciples that law claims for itself (see 
for example Harding 1986; 1987; 1996; Smart 
1995; 1989). Thus, while law is not a science, 
science is not objective and men are not neces-
sarily rational, their alignment with the scien-
tifi c discourses of reason, rationality and ob-
jectivity has ensured they are all constructed as 
such, the knowledge produced by experts can 
consequently be called upon to add ‘neutral’ 
scientifi c credibility to the already ‘rational’ 
procedures of law. Yet both are ‘produced 
under conditions of patriarchy’ (Smart 1989: 
86), and as such can be observed to intertwine 
and support each other in the maintenance of 
patriarchal relations. For example, they can be 
identifi ed as contributing to the undermining 
of personal accounts of events such as that 
provided by Sara Thornton by rendering them 
‘suspect and/or secondary’:
Everyday experiences are of little interests in terms 
of their meaning for individuals … So the legal 
process translates everyday experience into legal 
relevances, it excludes a great deal that might be 
relevant to the parties, and it makes its judgement 
on the scripted or tailored account … parties are 
not always silenced, but … how they are allowed 
to speak, and how their experience is turned into 
something the law can digest and process, is a 
demonstration of the power of law to disqualify 
alternative accounts (Smart p.11; p. 9)
This is not to suggest that law and expert 
knowledge ‘conspire’ to render violent women 
harmless. On the contrary, they can regularly 
be seen to argue from opposing perspectives, 
single-handed or independently of each other. 
As Worrall explains:
… dominance does not require the active domina-
tion of one group by another nor does it require any 
one individual’s structural position in a society to 
be constant. It is dependent, rather on a “sub-group 
… of relevance at any one time” … which produces 
ideas about “reality” and who is authorised to defi ne 
it … (Ardener cited in Worrall 1990: 11).
Thus, law does not always rely on, or even 
call upon, expert knowledge during the legal 
process. However, expert knowledge – like 
law – is phallocentric at heart and as such is 
part of what constitutes dominant knowledge, 
hence it is a key player when it comes to de-
fi ning reality. In that sense it can be under-
stood to form a part of what O’Donovan has 
called the ‘contest over knowledge between 
women’s groups and a largely male judici-
ary with male defi nitions and understandings 
of human behaviour, which are claimed as 
universal’ (O’Donovan 1993: 428). On the 
one side, women are fi ghting to establish 
authority over their own experiences and 
words by demanding that their accounts are 
validated (Ballinger 2003: 228). On the other 
side, phallocentric law and expert knowledge 
– combined or separately – are seeking to 
maintain their power to defi ne the dominant 
truth; what counts as ‘knowledge’ and the so-
cial order more generally. A crucial step in 
this process involves disqualifying alternative 
accounts by reinforcing gender stereotypes. 
That is, the use of expert knowledge (even 
when employed by the defence as in the Sara 
Thornton case), can be understood as work-
ing with law by turning the ‘script’ of the 
woman’s crime into something much more 
recognisable than a rational woman killing 
in self defence – the emotional, overwrought, 
hysterical, mad woman who cannot be held 
responsible for her actions. In constructing 
women as ‘the other’ against the defi nitive 
male standard (Faith 1994: 52) – and thus 
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as everything that men are not – this process 
of rendering women pathological reinforces 
gender inequality, and therefore ultimately 
serves to maintain the dominant gendered 
social order. 
The Paradox of Battered 
Women
While the intensity of this struggle over know-
ledge between women’s groups and phallocen-
tric law is linked to the threat battered women 
who kill pose to the social order, that threat in 
turn is linked to the contradiction or paradox 
these women present:
… battered women must manage to maintain two 
mutually exclusive ideas simultaneously as essential 
conditions of their survival … They must continue 
to exist in a world that still values the concept of 
marriage and family, while knowing that they live 
in a domestic war zone … They know that marriage 
and family can be terrifying prisons from which 
there is no escape, yet they continue to validate the 
societal ideal of marriage just by remaining in the 
[relationship] … (Morrissey 2003: 96 referring to 
Hart 1998: 177; original emphasis).
Due to their perplexing status as both victims 
and perpetrators – both guilty and blameless 
– these women force us to confront the inad-
equacy of a legal system ‘constructed around 
the advancement of male pursuits and the 
reso lution of male disputes’ (Morrissey 2003: 
70). The usual defences of provocation and 
diminished responsibility simply cannot ac-
commodate the socially produced differences 
between male and female behaviour within 
heteropatriarchy where these defences are 
‘rigidly defi ned and structured to refl ect male 
standards of behaviour and experiences …’ 
(Fox 1995: 178).
It is within this context that feminists are en-
gaged in the creation of new discourses through 
which the agency of battered women who 
kill can be heard and understood. So far, the 
most enduring alternative truth about battered 
women who kill is that of battered woman 
syndrome (BWS). Worrall explains that bat-
tered woman’s syndrome ‘was introduced to 
assist women’s claims that their perceptions 
and actions were reasonable, given the cir-
cumstances’ (Worrall 2002: 57). Fox agrees 
that the original aim of BWS was ‘to chal-
lenge the generic concept of reasonableness 
which operates in … criminal law by forcing 
it to include the perspectives of women’ (Fox 
1995: 182). Yet, the story of BWS provides a 
poignant example of the contest over know-
ledge between feminist activists and phallo-
centric law because it was soon appropriated 
to support dominant discourses around female 
behaviour and is now mainly used to support 
the defence of diminished responsibility (Wor-
rall 2002: 57). Indeed, several authors have 
suggested that the main reason BWS quickly 
gained popularity within courtrooms around 
Europe, North America and Australia may be 
precisely because it could so easily be made to 
refl ect dominant stereotypes of female behav-
iour with which phallocentric law was already 
familiar and comfortable (Downs cited in Mor-
rissey 2003: 78; Stubbs and Tolmie 2005: 195). 
Schneider agrees:
the legal strategy which led to the introduction of 
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome has 
been subverted by the tenacity of … sex stereotyp-
ing (cited in Fox 1995: 182).
Thus, while BWS originated from a perspec-
tive sympathetic to feminism, it soon became 
an example of how an alternative ‘truth’ can be 
neutralised and rendered devoid of agency – in 
turn facilitating its appropriation into dominant 
discourses of femininity – in this case the vic-
timised, helpless, pathological woman who 
cannot be held responsible for her actions.
One explanation for this appropriation may 
be that despite its well-intentioned aim of 
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supporting the feminist cause, the authority 
to determine its presence has always rested 
fi rmly with the experts, resulting in a conten-
tious and uneasy relationship between BWS 
and feminism. Understandably so, since, 
apart from the experts’ role in translating fe-
male agency into pathology, the mere fact 
that experts are called upon at all suggests 
female inadequacy and incompetence (Fox 
1995: 185) – women do not know their own 
minds, and therefore cannot be trusted to 
present their own testimony.
Some authors consider feminists themselves to 
be at least partly complicit in over-emphasis-
ing battered women who kill as helpless vic-
tims – ‘more sinned against than sinning’ – to 
be pitied rather than punished, hence playing 
their part in preventing the development of 
discourses within which such women can be 
regarded as responsible agents (Allen 1987: 
93; Morrissey 2003). It is therefore not sur-
prising that, in drawing heavily on the victim 
stereotype when analysing the predicament 
of battered women, the very theories which 
are meant to explain their violence, in fact do 
the exact opposite by contributing to existing 
stereotypes about female conduct and behav-
iour – that their actions were unintentional 
– the result of pathology rather than reason 
and rationality. In my analysis of the following 
case-studies I intend to challenge these accu-
sations of feminist complicity. I shall propose 
strategies which are designed to take account 
of culpability and responsibility, yet construct 
the women as less blameworthy without los-
ing sight of agency (Hudson 2002: 22). In 
short, the object of the analysis will be to cre-
ate an alternative truth about battered women 
who kill which is robust enough to accept ‘the 
production of an alternative battered woman 
subject who can be at once responsible and 
agentic, yet [also] vindicated and absolved’ 
(Morrissey 2003: 68).
The Cases
The cases were identifi ed by studying the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment Report 
1949-1953 as well as searching the National 
Archives data-base which revealed that apart 
from the fi ve women who were executed for 
killing their partner which I have discussed 
elsewhere (Ballinger 2000), another 13 women 
were sentenced to death for killing their part-
ners between 1900 and 1965 in England and 
Wales, but were subsequently reprieved. The 
case-fi les of all 13 women were studied and 
seven were identifi ed as involving domestic 
violence.5 It is of course impossible to deter-
mine whether the women whose case-fi les did 
not contain evidence of domestic violence had 
ever experienced such abuse. However, we 
can say with certainty that it was not a feature 
of the trial and such cases were therefore ex-
cluded from this project.
Space does not permit in-depth analyses of all 
seven cases. Two have therefore been chosen 
as representative of the cases studied. Before 
embarking on these case-studies, it is however, 
possible to draw attention to a common feature 
– all seven cases indicated that the women 
killed their partners after a considerable time 
lapse since they were last attacked. Five of 
the women were suspected of having killed 
their sleeping partners, the very type of killing 
which was so widely debated during the 1990s 
and which popularised the concept of ‘cumula-
tive provocation’, particularly with reference 
to the cases of Sara Thornton and Kiranjit 
Ahluwalia (Guardian 31st May 1996; Chan 
2001: 156-9). This is noteworthy because such 
 5 In one case - that of Catherine Thorpe - the fi les were 
‘missing’ - that is to say - The National Archives had 
misplaced them and could not say when they were li-
kely to be available for public inspection. Newspaper 
accounts were therefore consulted instead; they con-
fi rmed that domestic violence had been a feature of 
the relationship between Catherine Thorpe and Her-
bert Musgrove (The Times 2nd, 22nd, 28th, 30th April 
1925).
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cases were the only ones to result in the death 
sentence being issued, although ultimately all 
the cases concluded with a reprieve from this 
punishment. These cases therefore also provide 
documentation of the long history of this type 
of killing being considered far ‘worse’ due to 
the ‘cooling off’ period between the last as-
sault on the woman and her retaliation. That is, 
from a phallocentric perspective the women’s 
actions suggested pre-meditation, and hence 
callous, cold-blooded murder in sharp contrast 
to the majority of partner-killings which took 
place during the so-called ‘heat of the moment’ 
– usually during an argument and/or fi ght.6
The Case of Emma Byron
The fi rst case to be examined is that of 23 year 
old Emma Byron who stabbed her lover, 44 
year old Reggie Baker, after he threatened to 
abandon her and threw her out of the lodgings 
they shared. Undisputed evidence was heard 
during the trial that during their four months 
together Reggie’s treatment of Emma ‘was 
cruel in the extreme’ (HO144/587). For exam-
ple, their landlady Mrs Liard, testifi ed that he 
was ‘a fearful drinker, drunk nearly every day, 
abusing, beating and threatening to kill the Pris-
oner.’ She had frequently heard Emma scream 
as a result of Reggie’s attempts to strangle her 
and ‘he was always knocking her down’. He 
had further provoked her by calling her a pros-
titute and a woman of ‘no class’ (HO144/587). 
Mrs Liard’s son Raphael also testifi ed that:
Mr Baker was a shocking drunkard – a terrible 
drinker – in fact the witness never saw him sober… 
He constantly gave “Mrs Baker” “a good hiding,” 
and the witness had heard her cry and rush on to the 
landing in her nightdress through fear. The witness 
often heard Baker shout “I will kill you” (The Times 
19th November 1902).
 6 As noted in this paper, such ‘heat of the moment’ kil-
lings did not conclude with a death-sentence, hence 
they are excluded from this study.
Emma did not stab Reggie immediately fol-
lowing his abusive behaviour, but instead left 
home after breakfast and had two or three 
drinks in different public houses. At 12.30pm 
she bought a knife. At 2.30pm she met Reg-
gie at the post-offi ce where she stabbed him 
shortly afterwards (The Times 19th November 
1902). One witness, post offi ce worker Philip 
Morley who had known Reggie and Emma 
for 18 months, testifi ed that “she was per-
fectly sober and collected at the time’ of the 
stabbing (The Times 19th November 1902). 
Emma herself offered what appears to be a 
rational explanation for her crime immediately 
after her arrest when she said: ‘I killed him 
and he deserved it and the sooner I am killed 
the better’ meaning that she was aware she 
would receive the death penalty for her crime 
(HO144/687). Forty minutes later she added: 
‘Inspector, I wish to say something to you 
– I bought the knife & hit him but I did not 
know I was killing him’ (HO144/687 Judge’s 
Notes p.26). However, Isobel Kinggett, the 
housemaid in the lodgings, alleged that Emma 
had said: ‘I will kill him before the day is out’ 
(The Times 20th November 1902). Despite this 
potentially damaging evidence, the Coroner’s 
jury appeared sympathetic to Emma’s account 
of her actions, because it refused to fi nd her 
guilty of the charge of wilful murder, and in-
stead declared a verdict of manslaughter, to 
the dismay of the Coroner:
Do you mean that there was no malice?
 The Foreman – It was on the impulse of the 
moment. She did not go there with the intention of 
killing him.
 The Coroner said … there was no doubt that Mr 
Baker was killed … unlawfully. If the knife – a 
deadly weapon such as this – was used on the man 
with a deliberately mischievous intent, then it was 
a case of wilful murder.
A juryman – Her behaviour in the morning does 
not justify that (Quoted in The Times 20th No-
vember 1902).
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The jurors’ refusal to fi nd Emma guilty of 
murder strongly suggests that they placed her 
retaliation within the wider context of Reg-
gie’s abusive behaviour which allowed them to 
conclude that the killing was compatible with a 
verdict of manslaughter. However, phallocen-
tric law – constructed around the resolution of 
male disputes – found itself incapable of mak-
ing such a leap, and three weeks later Emma 
stood trial for wilful murder. Her defence that 
she had bought the knife in order to commit 
suicide was rejected, and she was found guilty 
of murder after eight minutes of deliberation by 
this second jury. During an era when a guilty 
verdict carried an automatic death sentence, 
the jurors appeared acutely aware of the harsh 
consequences of their verdict, and, like the 
Coroner’s jury three weeks earlier, also con-
sidered the wider context of abuse when they 
entered ‘the strongest possible recommenda-
tion to mercy’ (HO144/687; The Times 18th 
December 1902).
The injustice of imposing the death sentence 
on Emma also seemed obvious to outside ob-
servers of the trial outcome. For example, staff 
from the Baltic Cafe submitted a petition to the 
Home Secretary stating that ‘even though she 
committed murder, she was undoubtedly ag-
gravated beyond all reason’ (HO144/687). An-
other petitioner asked the Home Secretary:
‘to save the life of a poor wretched, ruined girl.. a 
girl ruined by a married man and taken from her 
work[,] deceived[,] ruined and then thrown on the 
street after he satisfi ed his lust (HO144/687).
Yet another petitioner wrote:
… when a woman passionately loves a man & 
has sacrifi ced her reputation & all that makes life 
worth living to her for his sake, & then that man 
deliberately casts her off to sink to the lowest depths 
as under the circumstances, seems her only future, 
though not technically “insane”, her mind is so 
unbalanced by the horror of the situation that it, 
for the time, ceases to be under the control of those 
sentiments & principles which ordinarily regulate 
it (HO144/687).
In short, contemporary observers of the case 
consistently situated their arguments within the 
wider context of Emma’s long-term victimisa-
tion which led them to provide a ‘reasonable’ 
explanation of her actions, and hence construct 
an alternative ‘truth’ which eliminated the need 
to deny her agency or rely on pathological ex-
cuses for her retaliation.
Even Reggie’s friends and colleagues at the 
Stock Exchange recognised the context within 
which Emma had killed and pleaded for mercy 
on her behalf:
… Reginald Baker had for a long period been 
known to a large number of them who had oppor-
tunities of seeing and knowing the harshness and 
wickedness of his character and have no doubts 
whatever that the threat to cast her off had been 
made by him to the said Emma Byron. This is a 
point we humbly claim should receive the fullest 
of recognition as there can be little doubt that it did 
reduce this poor girl to a condition of such poign-
ant shame and sorrow followed by a terrible loss of 
mental control as to make it well nigh impossible 
that she in any sense should realise the serious result 
of the offence she has committed (HO144/687).
Finally, Home Offi ce personnel whose respon-
sibility it was to advise the Home Secretary as 
to whether Emma deserved a reprieve from 
the death penalty, also demonstrated an ini-
tial willingness to place her crime within the 
wider context of the abuse she had suffered. 
They were thus able to acknowledge her guilt, 
and even account for the delay in retaliation 
without wishing to see her suffer the ultimate 
punishment:
The real question was provocation, and that was 
about as great as could be given to a woman in her 
position: continued, and brutal ill-treatment, with 
the selfi sh threat to abandon her, and turn her out of 
the lodging at which she was staying and in which 
he intended to remain himself, and though this 
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provocation did not immediately precede the com-
mission of the crime, it was so deep, and rankling, 
that it must have been instantly present to her when 
she struck the fatal blows (HO144/687).
Altogether, the willingness to consider the 
wider context of the killing generated consid-
erable sympathy and understanding towards 
Emma’s crime, which in turn allowed for the 
possibility of new discourses being created 
about abused women who kill. Yet the ‘failure’ 
to pathologise her crime carried its own inher-
ent danger, because if she was neither irrational 
nor hysterical her retaliation was once again 
in danger of being understood purely as cold-
blooded, premeditated murder. Hence, having 
initially shown a willingness to participate in 
the construction of an alternative truth, Home 
Offi ce advisers now reverted to traditional, 
phallocentric explanations:
In many respects it certainly was a very bad case, 
looking to the premeditation and callousness with 
which the prisoner purchased the knife, and it is 
impossible to conceive that the three blows were 
given by her without the intention either to kill or 
to grievous bodily harm (HO144/687).
The shifting attitudes of Home Offi ce person-
nel therefore reminds us that law does not 
consist of ‘a rigid system of male domination’ 
or patriarchal conspiracy (Smart 1995:130). 
The law does not operate solely in the inter-
ests of men, just as men do not operate solely 
in the interests of each other. Rather it is the 
production and re-production of the gendered 
subject in order to facilitate the maintenance 
of a gendered social order which constitutes 
an important aspect of law. Thus, in this case, 
the phallocentric nature of law did not permit 
a simultaneous acknowledgement of – on the 
one hand – the helpless, victimised female, 
and, on the other – that same female forming 
a ‘rational’ decision to commit murder. The 
distance between the discourses of the passive, 
submissive female victim and the ‘coldblooded 
femme fatale’ who calmly purchases the mur-
der weapon before arranging a rendezvous 
during which she stabs her lover, was too vast 
to permit the reproduction of the gendered 
subject, and further opportunity for a contest 
over dominant knowledge within law itself 
was eliminated.
At this point expert opinion entered the deliber-
ations. The medical offi cer at Holloway prison 
had kept Emma under ‘careful observation’ for 
six weeks before submitting his report, and 
whilst admitting that she did not show signs of 
mental illness during that period, he neverthe-
less pointed to a troubled past. Emma’s father 
and brother had died from alcoholism and her 
‘brother [was] also a drunkard’, while both her 
sisters were sterile ‘and one of them an epi-
leptic’ (HO144/687). Moreover, Emma herself 
had ‘been accustomed to alcoholic excess since 
the age of thirteen and had attempted suicide 
twice while still a teenager. Her sexuality was 
also problematised:
She has been sexually precocious, and from early 
years has consorted with youthful as well as older 
males for libidinous purposes, and later has engaged 
in unnatural practices with persons of her own sex 
(HO144/687).
The medical offi cer therefore considered her 
to be ‘of warm temperament … and prone 
to passionate outbreaks’ and her ‘family his-
tory … together with her mode of life would 
no doubt predispose to mental unsoundness’ 
(HO144/687).
Emma was further examined by psychiatrist 
Henry Maudsley who agreed that her crime 
did not have ‘the character of homicidal 
mania in the medical sense of the term … ’ 
Nonetheless:
the murder was done in a transport of passion, in 
consequence of the provocation she had received 
acting on passionate temperament perniciously 
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stimulated by the quantity of alcohol she had taken 
and perhaps constitutionally predisposed – if she 
has an epileptic brother as alleged – to impulsive 
outbreaks (HO144/687).
Thus, while on the one hand admitting that 
Emma was ‘entirely coherent in conversa-
tion, free from delusion, showing no loss of 
memory nor any symptom of mental disorder’, 
on the other hand, Maudsley proceeded to 
couch Emma’s state of mind in purely patho-
logical terms and even entered the realm of 
speculation when he suggested that if she had 
a brother who allegedly had epilepsy, this ill-
ness, if present, could be used to strengthen 
the evidence that she was prone to ‘impulsive 
outbreaks’ (HO144/687).
We have thus identifi ed the specifi c point 
where expert knowledge performed the trans-
lation from agentic to pathological behaviour 
in its analysis of Emma’s crime. In particu-
lar, we note that unlike the members of the 
public who petitioned the Home Secretary for 
a reprieve, Dr Maudsley made no reference 
to Reggie’s abusive behaviour whatsoever. 
On the contrary, he drew attention to the fact 
that Emma had ‘often brooded on suicide’ 
(HO144/687). Yet, despite appearing to con-
tradict legal discourses by attempting to pa-
thologise Emma’s actions, expert knowledge 
ultimately supported law in closing down the 
space around which new discourses were on 
the verge of being created and instead relied 
on conservative and traditional discourses 
which reinforced gender-stereotypes. An im-
portant aspect of this reinforcement focused 
on problematising Emma’s response to Reg-
gie’s behaviour rather than on his violence 
and abuse, confi rming Dobash and Dobash’s 
claim that it is the victims of domestic abuse 
who are problematised rather than the abus-
ers (Dobash and Dobash 1992: 214). Thus, 
while the petitioners ensured that Reggie was 
held partly responsible for Emma’s retalia-
tion by insisting on taking his history of vio-
lence into account, neither the medical offi c-
er’s nor Maudsley’s report made reference 
to this context of abuse within which Emma 
had acted. This failure to problematise male 
violence can ultimately be understood as one 
way of muting both Emma’s individual ex-
periences of victimisation as well as denying 
the oppression of women that domestic vio-
lence causes at a structural level. The refusal 
to acknowledge violence against women as 
an issue therefore also served to maintain the 
dominant truth about the nature of marriage/
relationships between men and women and 
the gendered social order more generally.
The Case of Fanny Gilligan
The second case to be examined is that of 37 
year old Fanny Gilligan, a married woman 
who had left her husband John, after meeting 
James Higgins whom she killed in 19117. She 
had lived with James ‘on and off’ for four 
years (HO144/5499). Undisputed evidence 
was presented of James’s violence towards 
Fanny at the trial. For example, his mother 
Elizabeth testifi ed that ‘he had knocked her 
about.’ He had also been ‘sent to prison for at-
tempting to set fi re to the house’ and had struck 
his mother ‘with his fi st’ (HO144/5499). The 
judge himself wrote in his notes: ‘I doubt not 
there had been violence used by the deceased 
…’ (HO144/5499). Indeed, James had been 
imprisoned previously for assaulting Fanny:
… on previous occasions the deceased had ill 
treated the prisoner by assaulting her … as late as 
July 1911, the prisoner, who had returned to her 
husband when the deceased had been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment, resumed co-habitation 
with him, on his release only because of his threats 
to injure her on which occasions the deceased also 
assaulted the prisoner’s husband (HO144/5499).
 7 Also (wrongly) reported to be 42 years old (HO144/5499 
- Judge’s letter to Home Secretary).
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On 16th September 1911 the couple had been 
drinking together after which they had a quar-
rel, and by 1a.m. James’s brother found him 
sitting at the kitchen table – unconscious and 
on fi re. He died several hours later from shock 
(HO144/5499). Fanny was found in a drunken 
stupor in the wash-house with ‘a beer bottle 
in her hand and one of James’s boots next to 
her. She said: ‘He kicked me with his hob-
nailed boot, I poured paraffi n over him, and 
set him alight’ (Birmingham Daily Post 8th 
December 1911). On the way to the police 
station she said:
He asked me to take his boots off. Little did he think 
that while I was taking them off I poured a pint of 
lamp oil down his legs, put a match to it, and out I 
came (HO144/5499).
When charged she said:
I wilfully intended to murder that man. I poured the 
lamp oil on him. I got the box of matches and set 
him on fi re; and I will do it again. Wilful murder I 
meant to do, and I done it. His mother fetched the 
lamp oil and I poured it on him, but he kicked me 
fi rst. I got my own back for my husband and myself. 
I don’t care if I swing for it … I did do it. I would 
do anything to murder him. I hope I have made 
room for a better man (HO144/5499).
At the inquest she added: ‘All I have to say is 
that I didn’t want to live with the man what-
ever’ (HO144/5499). At her trial the jury heard 
evidence from Edward Higgins – James’s 
brother – that he had ‘heard her say on many 
occasions that she would burn him’ but admit-
ted that ‘the last time was after he had been 
knocking her about’ (HO144/5499).
The Fanny Gilligan case thus provides a pow-
erful example of the determination of a victim 
of domestic violence to offer a rational ex-
planation for her actions based on her lived 
experience. However, medical experts proved 
to be equally determined to translate Fanny’s 
rational explanation into the language of pa-
thology. Thus, medical evidence was heard 
that ‘she had had fainting attacks 14 years 
ago.’ Yet, despite the fact that these attacks 
had taken place solely in connection with a 
number of miscarriages, and despite Fanny’s 
adamant denial that ‘she ever had any fi ts’, 
the medical offi cer maintained her symptoms 
pointed ‘to epileptic attacks, minor epilepsy’ 
(HO144/5499). Thus, while the doctor admitted 
Fanny had ‘had no epileptic symptoms’ since 
he had fi rst examined her, and that his diagno-
sis was based on symptoms which had taken 
place 14 years previously, and despite Fanny’s 
denial of ever having suffered from the disease, 
the doctor nevertheless based his report on the 
assumption that she was epileptic:
Epileptics are advised not to drink alcohol because 
it excites them, & may bring on an attack of excite-
ment[,] an attack of minor epilepsy [,] mild without 
convulsions, manifesting itself by a sudden loss 
of consciousness & followed by eccentricities of 
conduct.
Having thus constructed Fanny as an epilep-
tic, Dr Brown concluded that Fanny was a 
‘monoidieist’, and ‘alcohol intolerant’, that 
she was ‘insane’ at the time of the crime, and 
therefore ‘did not know the act was wrong’ 
(HO144/5499). As had been the case with 
Emma Byron’s medical report, Fanny’s report 
also relied on speculation and probabilities 
rather than actual evidence:
[although] she is at present apparently of sound 
mind, at the time of committing her crime, if she 
committed it, she was in all probability suffering 
from a true mental derangement due to the action of 
alcohol upon a nervous system inherently unstable 
(HO144/5499 emphasis added).
The ambiguity of the report was noted by the 
judge who, in his summing up, stated that ‘he 
found great diffi culty in following the argu-
ments which brought the doctor to the conclu-
sion that the prisoner was insane at the time’; 
that the evidence did ‘not fi t’ with the doctor’s 
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diagnosis and that ‘her own statements’ were 
evidence of her sanity (Birmingham Daily Post 
8th December 1911).
The jurors appeared to share the judge’s scepti-
cism of expert knowledge for after thirty min-
utes of deliberation they found Fanny guilty of 
wilful murder with a recommendation to mercy 
on the grounds of provocation (HO144/5499). 
Thus, as had been the case with Emma By-
ron’s jury a decade earlier, Fanny’s jury too 
resisted pathologising her crime. Instead, its 
recommendation to mercy signalled a desire to 
rationalise her behaviour, yet sympathise with 
her – simultaneously recognising that while 
Fanny must take responsibility for her crime 
– within the wider context of her victimisation 
she should not suffer equal punishment to that 
of other murderers.
In view of the ambiguous nature of the ini-
tial medical reports, the Home Secretary now 
called for a new medical inquiry to take place 
after the trial had ended. The doctors involved 
conceded that they had been:
unable to discover the existence of any delusion or 
other deviation from normal in her mental condition, 
and we are of [the] opinion that Fanny Gilligan is 
at the present time of sound mind & responsible for 
her actions … As to the state of her mind at the time 
the murder was committed, we have been unable to 
elicit from her anything that would point to the exist-
ence of epilepsy or insanity. She has no recollection 
whatever of the murder itself or of the circumstances 
immediately associated therewith, & we have formed 
the opinion … that the oblivion in which the crime is 
enveloped as far as prisoner is concerned is genuine 
in spite of certain utterances of hers, which must ap-
pear to point to the contrary. We have no doubt that 
she was very drunk at the time of the murder & that 
her brain was so paralysed by the toxic action of the 
alcohol that her mental faculties were obscured to 
such an extent that she was incapable of exercising 
her normal self control. We further believe that she 
had no sober intention of killing the deceased & that 
her act of setting him on fi re was referable only to 
the effects of drink (HO144/5499).
Once again the ambiguity and contradictory 
nature of the report is noteworthy. Fanny was 
deemed to be rational and responsible for her 
actions, showing no signs of either epilepsy or 
insanity. Yet, her ‘oblivion’ was considered 
genuine, her mental faculties were severely 
impaired by alcohol, hence there was no ‘sober 
intention’ to kill. In short, her crime lacked in-
tention, therefore, ultimately, she could not be 
held fully responsible. Thus, the point at which 
a retaliating woman’s agency was translated 
into pathology has again been identifi ed..
At fi rst glance it appeared that law – in the 
form of the trial judge – challenged expert 
knowledge and thus validated Fanny’s own 
account of events, for ‘he thought the prisoner 
intended to take away the life of the man … 
she had said so herself, her own mouth was 
the mouth that convicted her’ (HO144/5499). 
Similarly, Home Offi ce personnel advising 
the Home Secretary as to whether Fanny’s 
case merited a reprieve, also indicated strong 
scepticism about the medical evidence:
I do not think this is a case where drunkenness can 
be allowed to mitigate the penalty … The prisoner 
knew where the paraffi n bottle was + must have 
fetched it from the pantry shelf. The process of 
pouring it over the man’s trousers + setting a lighted 
match to the soaking stuff was one requiring some 
amount of calculation (HO144/5499).
A second Home Offi ce adviser shared this 
view:
I agree with Mr B… that the way in which the mur-
der was committed was too deliberate and purpose-
ful to admit of the plea of insanity + drunkenness 
being acceptable (HO144/5499).
However, a closer examination reveals that this 
challenge to expert knowledge was not rooted 
in a desire to understand Fanny’s experiential 
standpoint and hence create new discourses 
within which she could be held responsible and 
agentic – yet also vindicated of and absolved 
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from her crime. On the contrary, rendering 
Fanny sane was a necessary fi rst step towards 
justifying her execution – for both advisers 
agreed that this was ‘not a case for interfer-
ence’, and ‘the law should take its course’ 
(HO144/5499).
Thus, while initially a difference of opinion 
between legal and medical experts appeared to 
exist, that difference merely revolved around 
the particular strategy to be implemented to 
achieve the end result in which they were 
united – the silencing of Fanny’s experiential 
account. In that sense, they both insisted on in-
terpreting Fanny’s case through phallocentric 
discourses which reinforced dominant know-
ledge and the social order, and conversely, 
left no space for subjugated knowledge to be 
heard. For example, phallocentric discourses 
were encapsulated in an early 20th century 
version of the modern cliché – ‘why didn’t 
she leave’ when one adviser wrote: ‘I doubt 
if it was immediate provocation, in any case, 
if the man treated her badly, it was open to 
her to leave him and go back to her husband’ 
(HO144/5499).
Thus, both legal and expert knowledge prob-
lematised Fanny’s retaliation rather than 
James’s violence – medical experts by ren-
dering Fanny insane, thereby reproducing the 
gender-stereotype of the irrational, hysterical, 
irresponsible woman who is not to be taken 
seriously. Law, which, despite the judge’s spe-
cifi c reference to the violence she had suffered, 
still judged her retaliation entirely from its 
inbuilt phallocentric value system – oblivious 
to the fact that then – as now – women can-
not avoid violence simply by leaving a vio-
lent partner. On the contrary, the actual act of 
leaving may itself be regarded as provocation 
(Fox 1995: 175). Indeed, as indicated above, 
evidence was presented that this was exactly 
what had happened on a previous occasion 
when Fanny tried to leave James, which re-
sulted in him assaulting both her and her hus-
band. Furthermore, questioning why Fanny did 
not leave suggests that she was culpable in the 
violence committed against her, and as Morris-
sey has noted: ‘Emphasising female culpability 
makes it unnecessary to concede that domestic 
violence constitutes serious criminal assault’ 
(Morrissey 2003:70).
In short, while on the surface law and ex-
perts may have appeared to disagree about 
the specifi c method with which to mute Fan-
ny’s account, they were united – consciously 
or unconsciously – in the overall aim of pro-
ducing and re-producing the gendered subject 
– whether that was through rendering Fanny 
insane and irresponsible and therefore not to 
be taken seriously, or whether through render-
ing her punishable, and therefore taking her 
extremely seriously – ignoring the socially 
produced gender differences and inequalities 
which existed between the sexes and instead 
treating her as if she were a man and executing 
her. In either case the fi nal outcome would be 
the maintenance of the gendered social order 
with the power to defi ne knowledge and reality 
fi rmly remaining in the hands of the powerful 
while the voices of the powerless remained 
subjugated (Sawicki 1991: 57). The struggle 
over knowledge would almost have been over 
before it began had it not been for another 
consideration which needed to be taken into 
account – that of legitimacy.
As noted above, this article rejects the notion of 
a conspiratorial legal process. On the contrary, 
the importance of maintaining legal hegemony 
through popular consent should not be under-
estimated, and reprieving women who were 
perceived by many as having already suffered 
enough, can be seen to play an important part 
in achieving this goal. As Connell has noted, 
the state’s non-intervention into domestic vio-
lence cases is maintained only ‘up to the point 
where a public-realm scandal is created and 
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state legitimacy is at issue’ (Connell 1996: 
156). Thus, intervening into the legal process 
by granting a pardon in cases such as Emma’s 
and Fanny’s can be understood as a way of 
demonstrating the moral justness of law while 
simultaneously preventing legal changes to the 
handling of domestic violence cases. That is to 
say, executing women in such cases posed a 
real risk to legitimacy since the phallocentric 
nature of law would have become dangerously 
exposed – demonstrating the ‘impossibility of 
achieving justice through a strict application of 
its rules and regulations … ’ (Morrissey 2003: 
95). In contrast, reprieving women in such 
cases ensured the continued individualisation 
of domestic violence by representing ‘these 
women’s abusive relationships with their male 
partners as unusual, and their murders as ex-
traordinary, rather than as the worst results of 
an institution of marriage which historically 
and traditionally has enshrined unequal rela-
tions between men and women’ (Morrissey 
2003: 20). In short, the strategy of showing 
mercy towards battered women who killed 
can be understood as a reactionary one since 
it ultimately ensured the inequalities inherent 
within relationships between men and women 
remained unchallenged. As such, this strategy 
contributed to the main tenance of the gendered 
social order.
Conclusion
This paper began by arguing that law and ex-
pert knowledge are built on the Enlightenment 
principles of reason, rationality and objectiv-
ity, hence are masculinist in nature, and as 
such, are concerned with the reproduction of 
heteropatriarchal relations. Within this context 
O’Donovan has described the construction of 
the ‘reasonable man’:
The construct possesses the ability to respond im-
mediately to violence necessary to repel an invader 
of his bodily integrity, or to vindicate an insult to 
his masculinity. He can remain reasonable whilst 
losing mastery of his mind under provocation. In 
short, in his physical ability, in action and response, 
he is embodied as a male. He feels powerful enough 
to defend himself or to lose his temper. This con-
struct is built into the law as a defi nition of the 
defences to homicide. His existence does not have 
to be justifi ed by expert evidence. He is taken to 
be part of the common sense experience of us all 
(O’Donovan 1993: 428-9).
The construction of the ‘reasonable man’ is 
thus built upon an inherent contradiction – 
commonsensically constructed as universal 
– yet, in reality it only applies ‘to those with 
power over knowledge’ (O’Donovan 1993: 
429). This is hardly surprising since the foun-
dations of law were established long before 
women gained legal rights and formal equality. 
Consequently, the contradiction upon which 
‘reasonable man’ is built only became ap-
parent – indeed only became a contradiction 
after women won formal equality. Hence, it 
is at the very point of this contradiction that 
feminists are engaged in challenging phallo-
centric law by creating discourses applicable 
to those who are still excluded from this con-
struction – women. In doing so feminists are 
requiring the defi ners of knowledge ‘to adopt 
a different consciousness’ – one in which law 
no longer considers it necessary to perform 
the legal gymnastics of rendering retaliating 
women harmless, but instead is prepared to 
render them ‘reasonable’. In that sense, femi-
nists are not demanding an abandonment of 
all Enlightenment principles, rather they are 
arguing for full participation in defi ning those 
principles; hence they are engaged in ‘a strug-
gle over meaning in which challenges to tradi-
tional knowledge (power) require no less than 
a major change in forms of subjectivity and 
understanding’ (Smart 1989: 2).
While feminists have experienced a large 
measure of success in terms of the outcome 
of individual cases as that of Sara Thornton and 
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many others illustrate8, it is nevertheless the 
case that the discursive battle is still ongoing, 
and will only have been won when women can 
successfully plead self-defence after killing an 
abusive partner. As Jackson has argued:
Legal reform, without a fundamental overhaul of 
the interpretative background, amounts to little 
more than tinkering with the edges of systematic 
and structural injustice (Jackson 1994 cited in Chan 
2001: 169).
Within this context the purpose of these new dis-
courses is to challenge ‘law’s ability to impose 
its defi nition of events on everyday life’ (Smart 
1989: 4), and instead create spaces on which 
the subjugated knowledge within the lived ex-
periences of battered women can be heard and 
understood. For example, we need mainstream 
discourses – outside as well as within law – 
which recognises ‘gendered fear’ (O’Donovan 
1993: 429), because they would help us over-
turn the commonsensical phallocentric question 
of ‘why didn’t she leave’, and instead celebrate 
the success of women who, despite grave dan-
ger, manage to escape violent relationships. 
We also need mainstream discourses – outside 
and within law – which allows an understand-
ing that the level of brutality experienced by 
abused women represents the ‘extreme end of 
a continuum of allowable domestically violent 
behaviour from men … rather than isolated, in-
dividual events’ (Morrissey 2003: 92).
Whilst recognising that ‘feminist discourses 
lack the social power to realise their versions 
of knowledge in institutional practices, they 
can offer discursive space from which the in-
dividual can resist dominant subject positions’ 
(Weedon 1987 cited in Smart 1989: 25). Thus, 
we have already witnessed feminism’s ability 
to place the criminal justice system under strain 
when processing individual cases of retaliat-
 8 For example Kiranjit Ahluwalia and Emma Humphrys 
(Ballinger 1996; 2000).
ing women such as Sara Thornton, and more 
recently Donna Tinker (Observer 24.11.02). 
Feminism therefore continues to challenge 
law’s imperviousness ‘to feminist perspectives’ 
(Mossman cited in O’Donovan 1993: 432), and 
will only be able to claim success in overturning 
masculinist discourses when battered women 
are no longer judged – either inside or outside 
the courtroom – through the phallocentric con-
struction of the ‘reasonable man’, and are no 
longer judged through the equally phallocen-
tric discourses of the unreasonable, irrational, 
psychologically impaired ‘or just plain crazy’ 
woman who lacks agency and has no control 
over her actions (O’Donovan 1993: 431).
Fox agrees that to achieve such a fundamental 
ideological shift it is necessary ‘to adopt a posi-
tion outside of law’, fi rst, by campaigning for 
resources to fund adequate refuges, a  process 
which should also help to vastly increase pub-
lic awareness of the current inadequacy of such 
funding as well as the widespread nature of 
domestic violence. It should also ensure that 
all women have the option of leaving violent 
relationships. Second, sex-stereotyping can be 
combated in practical terms, for example by 
empowering ‘young girls by educating them 
in self-defence tactics’ which would ‘subvert 
the perceptions of their male peers that they are 
weak and passive’ (Fox 1995: 188).9
Third, and of particular relevance to the argu-
ments presented above, there is the issue of 
language itself. If the muting of women’s own 
experiential accounts of events is to cease, 
we must ensure that a language exists within 
which they can adequately convey the reality 
of their lives:
 9 It may of course be argued that this strategy of teaching 
girls self-defence tactics involves potential victims ta-
king responsibility for their own safety, or ‘manage’ 
the danger around them, rather than challenging the 
aggressive behaviour of the would-be offender (Stanko 
1988). As such, this strategy is not unproblematic.
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Only when women can articulate their experiences 
and render visible to society and juries the extreme 
physical and emotional abuse to women’s bodies 
which the oxymoronic term ‘domestic violence’ 
obscures, can we begin to formulate a more effec-
tive strategy for legal interventions which really 
protects women and prevents men from infl icting 
such violence (Fox 1995: 188-9).
This would involve shifting the focus away 
from the victim towards the perpetrator of 
violence, for example by framing questions 
in terms of ‘why does the man batter’ or ‘why 
does society tolerate men who batter?’ (Fox 
1995: 189), or indeed, ‘why doesn’t he leave’ 
if he is fi nding his partner’s behaviour so prob-
lematic, rather than asking ‘why doesn’t the 
woman leave’?
It is within this context that Fox suggests it 
may be possible to also subvert the role and 
nature of expert knowledge. Thus, rather than 
rejecting expert knowledge altogether, a femi-
nist strategy may involve campaigns to replace 
masculinist expert knowledge with our own 
expert knowledge – for example in the form of 
refuge workers’ testimony or the testimonies 
of those who work in rape crises centres. If 
successful, such a campaign could undermine 
BWS style evidence ‘which is commonly in-
terpreted as focusing on the pathology of the 
particular offender … and easily read as an 
exercise of compassion for individual tragedy’, 
towards a more structural explanation which 
attempts ‘to highlight systemic inequalities 
faced by women who are seeking to argue 
a defence such as self-defence’ (Stubbs and 
Tolmie 2005: 196).
Within this new discursive framework, the ac-
tions of women who retaliate by killing their 
abusers would be judged through discourses 
which recognise their agency without neces-
sarily resulting in harsher punishment. That 
is to say, ‘battered women would be consid-
ered to have made a rational choice in killing 
abusive, life-threatening partners, yet to have 
been coerced into that decision through lack 
of societal support and recognition of their 
situ ation’ (Morrissey 2003: 102). This would 
allow for the recognition that battered women 
have agency ‘in the sense that they are not 
acting out of mental or physical compulsion.’ 
However, they do ‘have a very restricted range 
of choice’ (Hudson 2002: 37) due to the long 
history of ‘western heteropatriarchy’s alle-
giance to the doctrine of the public/private 
split’ which is at the root of the reluctance 
to accept societal responsibility for violence 
against women (Morrissey 2003: 87).
Only when such discourses are in place will 
women stop paying the heavy price for ‘le-
niency’ as demonstrated in the case-studies 
of Emma Byron and Fanny Gilligan – that 
is – exchanging culpability and agency with 
irrationality and mental illness. Indeed within 
such a discursive framework there would be 
concern to prevent domestic violence from 
occurring in the fi rst place because we will 
have begun the journey to locate violence 
against women within the context of the 
wider, structural power inequalities between 
men and women.
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